IN HIS masterpiece, "On War," Karl von Clausewitz declared that "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its true nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."
Now that we have called up the reserves and "declared war," it only would be prudent to place our decisions and declarations in the framework of Clausewitzian analysis. What, for example, is the American definition of victory in this "war"? How likely is it that we will achieve such victory? Who are our enemies? What will these enemies have to do to show that they are defeated?
One of the first principles of warfare, according to Clausewitz, is to know your enemy. It behooves us to recognize first of all that those who carried out the terrible strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon almost certainly will be thought of by their compatriots and millions of their co-religionists - particularly by young males - as extraordinarily skillful and daring warriors. That others will be ready to replace those who were killed, or those who will be killed, hardly is open to doubt.
This is not surprising. The willingness and courage to die for a cause has been the subject of myth in all human cultures since men first took up the profession of arms. It is not just the attribute of "evil," "fanatic" or "cowardly" Muslims. It was the code of the Viking warrior, the Japanese Kamikaze pilots, and even the biblical Samson who tore down the Philistine temple, killing himself and 3,000 of the hated enemy.
The perpetrators of the recent attacks were not teenagers. They were mature soldiers, many of them with families, who trained for years to carry out a mission in which they would be armed only with box cutters and pen knives. This took courage, determination and skill resulting from extensive training. To these terrorists, threats of sanction or punishment must ring hollow.
The only way to deter such people is to kill them before they can act or to destroy the environment in which they operate. Neither course of action will be feasible in the short term. It will require many years, probably decades, to carry out. Whether the United States has what it takes to accomplish this, while at the same time preserving the best aspects of our way of life, remains to be seen.
What should be crystal clear to all is that the United States by itself lacks the capacity to deal with a terrorist problem that is global in nature. To win this "war" will require at least the tacit assistance of all the major nations of the world. Even one or two of them, reluctant to enter an anti-terrorist coalition under Washington's leadership, could be enough to thwart an American victory.
We will need the full support of our allies militarily, politically and psychologically. Economic disputes will have to take a back seat to the principal task we have set for ourselves. Our allies thus far unequivocally have been supportive. Keeping them in that frame of mind will not be a simple matter for many reasons, a principle one being their dependence on Middle East oil.
Lessening that dependence should be a principal goal of the United States in the decades ahead. It is no accident that many of the states that have directly supported terrorism in the past - Iraq, Iran, Libya - are awash in oil money that they earn from selling petroleum to us and our allies. A "Manhattan Project" to develop fuel cell and other technologies to enhance and ultimately replace the gasoline-powered engine should be a direct outgrowth of the "war" in which we are engaged.
Another country whose good will and support will be crucial to us in any "war" against international terrorism will be Russia. Moscow has assets, including knowledge, which will be critical to us as we try to smash the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden. The Russian Federal Security Service has the motivation, knowledge and capacity to be a vital intelligence and military partner in a worldwide, anti-terrorist struggle.
After the Cold War ended in 1991, we talked of establishing a "strategic partnership" with the Russians and for various reasons have let this relationship languish. To garner Russian assistance in our current "war effort," however, will require greater sensitivity to Russian security requirements in such areas as NATO enlargement and missile defense. It is vital for us to move ahead with the creation of a real "strategic partnership" to which we only paid lip service a decade ago.
In sum, if we are to succeed in this difficult endeavor, we have to realize that it will require an end to the arrogance and unilateralist tendencies that many in the world feel have come to characterize the American position in world affairs. We cannot win this war unless we change the image of the sole superpower, or what the French call the "hyper power" - hyperpuissance. This is simple strategic analysis. Clausewitz, who was famous for noting that war is a continuation of diplomacy, would have approved.
(Marshall Brement is the Cumming Professor of Diplomacy in the government department.)