WITH WEAPONS inspectors on the ground and American forces readying for action, war with Iraq is a subject at the forefront of American minds. The Bush administration is perhaps the most ardent proponent of war and it has called repeatedly for Saddam Hussein's ouster under its new policy of preemption. The administration's concern is understandable, but preemption is a risky and unproven strategy that cannot be adopted except in the face of grave threats to American security. Until the administration proves conclusively that such a threat exists, it should continue to pursue the policies of containment that have controlled the Iraqi threat successfully for the last 10 years.
The administration has argued that amid the war on terror, containment must be discarded in favor of preemption, which likely means war. Congress, the American people and, increasingly, the international community have accepted this claim, but without much thought as to why. The switch to preemption represents a drastic change in our method of resolving the Iraqi threat and Americans would do well to ask if such a change is really justified.
Containment has served admirably to address the lingering threat posed by Hussein. Economic sanctions and an arms embargo have prevented Hussein from reconstituting his military, while the establishment of no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq has prevented his oppression of Kurds and Shiites in those areas. A large and sustained American military presence in the Persian Gulf has deterred any bigger military adventures and kept Hussein from pursuing his goal of regional hegemony. This three-pronged strategy of containment has kept Hussein comfortably under control for over a decade at minimal cost and minimal risk to American interests.
The administration cannot expect so much from preemption, a strategy whose risks and costs are far more assured than its benefits. The short-term risks of preemptive war will be born by American soldiers and American allies in the region, both of whom will be targets of whatever weapons of mass destruction Hussein can muster. America's economy will also suffer, particularly if war leads to rising oil prices and a long period of budget deficits. In the medium-term, we will be stuck with the thankless task of administering a conquered Iraq, rebuilding its ruined economy and establishing a viable democratic government. And in the long-term, a war will damage America's standing in the world and we may face more terrorist threats from a new generation of radicalized Arabs.
If the war or its aftermath goes badly, American security will benefit little from preemption and we may create more serious threats even as we depose Hussein. Given its substantial risks and uncertain benefits, a strategy of preemption should not be adopted unless a real and imminent Iraqi threat demands it. But the administration has yet to produce any evidence of such a threat, beyond the litany of crimes Hussein has committed in the past.
Hussein's crimes are many and awful and the administration has spent months recounting them for the world. They include invasions of Iran and Kuwait, the use of poison gas against his domestic Kurdish population, the ruthless oppression of the Iraqi people and a plot to assassinate the first President Bush. But each of these crimes was committed long before the administration began calling for war and they are not evidence of a continuing threat requiring an immediate military response. The administration has long known that Hussein is a merciless dictator with a history of aggression, but until recently, this did not convince them that a policy of containment was insufficient to address the threat he posed.
The more likely cause of the administration's policy of preemption is the climate of fear and vulnerability engendered by the terrorist attacks of September 11. In the wake of the attacks, America experienced a renewed awareness of the threats posed by international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and with it, renewed speculation that Iraq may be involved with both. But while September 11 has raised our awareness of the Iraqi threat, it has not changed the magnitude of that threat and there is little reason to believe that containment has suddenly become unworkable. A general fear of terrorism may cause us to pay more attention to Iraq, but fear alone cannot justify a radical change in American policy.
In the absence of an immediate and clearly defined Iraqi threat, it is irresponsible to replace a proven strategy of containment with a high-risk, untested policy of preemptive war. The administration has proposed just such a change, but has yet to show that it is justified by a major change in the Iraqi threat to American security. As Americans weigh the pros and cons of preemptive war, we would do well to remember that the Iraqi threat has changed little since September 11 and neither should our method of addressing it.
(Alec Solotorovsky's column appears
Fridays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at asolotorovsky@cavalierdaily.com)
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