HOSTILE dictators are a puzzle for America. Everyone
knows they're dangerous and everyone wants to be rid of them, but sometimes the removal process is more problematic than the initial threat they pose. In such cases, America's best choice is to pursue a policy of deterrence and suffer their existence until a palace coup or a timely death renders the whole business moot.
The Bush administration has recognized this logic in its standoff with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, but has yet to acknowledge that the same applies to Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein. Both have sought nuclear weapons in violation of international law and agreement, but the administration has pursued a diplomatic solution in North Korea while pushing for preemptive war in Iraq. Although the two situations are certainly different, there are substantial similarities and the United States should approach both in similar fashion. The Bush Administration's relative tolerance of North Korea's nuclear ambitions reveals its belief that deterrence still works and there is little reason to believe that it cannot also work in Iraq.
In October, North Korea confirmed America's longstanding suspicions by announcing that it has been pursuing a nuclear weapons program in violation of its 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea subsequently expelled two U.N. weapons inspectors and reopened a nuclear reactor designed to produce weapons grade plutonium. Since then, Kim's regime has launched a steady stream of invective against the United States and pursued its weapons program with impunity.
The administration's response to these provocations has generally been sensible and should serve as a model for its handling of Iraq. Shortly after North Korea's initial announcement, the United States and its allies in the region suspended fuel shipments to North Korea and demanded that Kim cease his weapon building. Since then, the administration has pursued a policy of relative disengagement, rightly refusing to make concessions to North Korea but carefully avoiding the possibility of a military confrontation.
Although this non-confrontational policy is dictated in part by the North's ability to inflict massive damage on South Korea (Seoul lies within easy reach of North Korean artillery), it is a tacit acknowledgement that deterrence remains a workable policy. If the administration believed that North Korea was a serious threat to attack the United States with nuclear weapons, it likely would advocate a preemptive strike whatever the consequences for South Korea. But the measured response and utter lack of urgency the administration has shown North Korea suggests instead its belief that America's deterrence posture is protection enough against any North Korean threat.
The United States has a nuclear arsenal far superior to anything North Korea might develop and maintains a force of 37,000 troops in South Korea. In the event of a nuclear attack by the North, these forces would assure Kim's rapid demise and it is the knowledge of devastating retaliation that will prevent him from ever using nuclear weapons in the first place.
The same logic of deterrence applies to Iraq, where the United States is equally capable of retaliation. American missiles can reach Baghdad as easily as Pyongyang, and the presence of over 100,000 American troops in the Middle East would further assure Hussein's destruction, should he attempt a nuclear attack. With such a preponderance of American forces arrayed against him, Hussein could not launch a nuclear strike without initiating his own annihilation.
Given, then, the impossibility of using nuclear weapons offensively, it is likely that Kim and Hussein are seeking them as protection against perceived threats to their regimes. Diplomatically isolated, economically stagnant and faced with major American troop concentrations on their borders, Kim and Hussein see nuclear weapons as a way to gain security cheaply. Their possession of nuclear weapons would have some deterrent effect on the United States and thus reduce the threat that their regimes might be toppled by force of American arms. Such a development would be cause for concern, but need not be cause for war. The same logic of deterrence that saw the United States through 40 years of nuclear rivalry with the Soviet Union means that even a nuclear armed Iraq or North Korea would pose little threat to American security.
It is only when faced with a major threat to their survival that Kim or Hussein might lash out with weapons of mass destruction and, ironically, it is just such a threat that the administration is making in Iraq. Whatever his ideological pretensions, Hussein is a survivor and if left to his own, he will be content with the survival of himself and his regime. He will refrain from using weapons of mass destruction as long as he believes that doing so will prolong his tenure in power. But if the United States commits to his overthrow no matter what, Hussein will have little incentive to restrain himself and may unleash whatever weapons of mass destruction he has left. The Bush Administration has worked hard to convince Americans that a preemptive war will reduce the level of Iraqi threat, but in reality, a war will only increase that threat.
The recent standoff in North Korea has cast new light on America's handling of Iraq and shown that even the Bush Administration considers deterrence a safer course than war. Despite the strategic differences between Hussein's Iraq and Kim's North Korea, both can be deterred from using nuclear weapons and the administration should pursue such a policy in both countries. If deterrence can work in North Korea, it can work in Iraq. And if deterrence can work in Iraq, then war is unnecessary.
(Alec Solotorovsky's column appears Fridays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at asolotorovsky@cavalierdaily.com.)
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