Speaking in Kennesaw, Georgia, last week, President Bush said that in dealing with Iraq, "trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not an option." More simply, America cannot tolerate Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction, because Hussein does not obey normal rules of deterrence.
Such is the conventional wisdom of the Bush administration, as well as its primary justification for war. But throughout his 30 years in power, Hussein has shown himself to be eminently deterrable. Before the administration commits America to an unpopular war of unknown consequences, it should consider the possibility that Hussein's weapons might be rendered harmless by a long-term policy of deterrence.
The primary argument against deterrence is that Hussein is irrational -- any ruler who invades neighbors, murders family members and poisons his own people is not guided by the careful logic that makes deterrence work. But tyranny and cruelty are not the same as irrationality. Since the days of the Persian Gulf War, Hussein has shown a careful consideration of the consequences of his actions and a reluctance to take actions that might bring an end to his rule.
Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is often cited as an example of his irrationality -- by invading Kuwait without regard for the devastating consequences American intervention would bring, Hussein showed that he would not be deterred by superior military forces. But in August of 1990, American intervention was far from assured. Shortly before the invasion of Kuwait, Hussein met with U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie, who assured him that the United States had "no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts" and no special security commitments to Kuwait.
Hussein, then, invaded Kuwait only after concluding that the United States would not intervene -- had the United States clearly stated its intention to defend Kuwait, Hussein's thinking likely would have changed. The fact that Hussein considered America's response before invading shows that he is, in fact, sensitive to American pressure and fearful of American threats. The failure of American power to deter his aggression in 1990 owes more to the ambiguity of American messages than to any irrationality on Hussein's part.
The chemical attacks on Kurdish villages are cited as further evidence of Hussein's irrationality -- by using chemical weapons against his own people, Hussein proved himself a madman who must be violently opposed. But more instructive than Hussein's use of chemical weapons are two instances when he did not use them. During the Persian Gulf War, Hussein launched hundreds of Scud missiles, primarily targeting Israeli cities and American forces in the region. But despite his extensive stocks of chemical and biological weapons, none of these missiles was ever armed with anything but conventional explosives.
Hussein's restraint during the Gulf War was largely the product of American threats. Early in the conflict, President George H.W. Bush made clear that Hussein's use of weapons of mass destruction would bring about an American campaign to topple his regime. Although Hussein could have caused significant American casualties with a chemical or biological strike, he chose instead to accept defeat and maintain his grip on power. That Hussein did not use weapons of mass destruction during the Gulf War reveals a cautious, rational leader far from the psychopath the Bush administration believes him to be.
Even Hussein's murder of family members is rational, if one remembers that his sole objective is to prolong the life of his regime. Hussein's willingness to kill wayward relatives (such as his two sons-in-law Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel) is horrifying and might be irrational if his primary objective was a happy domestic life. But a dictator who rules by force has little choice but to jail or kill those who threaten his regime. Hussein's goal is to maintain power, and when family members threaten him, their murder is a rational (if reprehensible) pursuit of that goal.
The administration has taken great pains to show that Hussein is irrational and cannot be trusted. But whatever his cruelty and brutality, Hussein has proven himself a highly rational decision maker who does what it takes to stay in power. Such a leader can be readily deterred from using weapons of mass destruction -- the United States has only to make clear that any use of forbidden weapons will bring about an American invasion and the speedy end of Hussein's rule.
Contrary to Bush's belief, it is entirely possible to trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi leader cannot be deterred by mixed messages, but he is easily deterred by clear limits and credible threats. Such tactics have worked in the past, and there is no reason to believe they must fail in the future.
(Alec Solotorovsky is a Cavalier Daily associate editor. He can be reached at asolotorovsky@cavalierdaily.com)
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