LAST WEEK, President Bush plunged headfirst into the Middle East peace process, meeting with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to discuss a new plan for their reconciliation. The "road map" to peace, as the new plan is called, was accepted by both parties, but it will not likely form the foundation of an enduring settlement.
Like the failed peace plans of the past, the "road map" envisions two states for two peoples -- a secure Israel and a fully independent Palestinian state living side by side in mutual peace and prosperity. And like the failed plans of the past, the road map is unwilling to demand the concessions required of each side if such a vision is to be realized. The most significant of these regard Israeli settlements and the Palestinian right of return. If Bush is to broker a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians, he must first win an agreement on these critical issues.
There cannot be a Palestinian state pockmarked by Jewish settlements, nor can there be a Jewish state deluged by returning Palestinian refugees. In order to achieve a meaningful statehood, in which each group may determine its own destiny within its own borders, Israelis and Palestinians must accept that they cannot reside permanently in each others territory. As preconditions of a viable two-state solution, Palestinian refugees must renounce their right of return and Israeli settlers must abandon their West Bank outposts.
But despite their longtime goal of two states for two peoples, neither the Palestinian Authority nor the Israeli government has acknowledged these difficult facts. Throughout the peace process, leaders on both sides have allowed their people to believe that they might settle on either side of the green line after a final settlement is reached.
The United States has supported both sides in this deception by promoting peace plans that save refugees and settlements for the final stages of negotiation. The road map is no different. Its first phase calls upon Israel to dismantle settlements constructed since March 2001 and to halt new settlement activity, but no mention is made of existing settlements until phase three, when a permanent status agreement is to be concluded. Even then, the "road map" is unclear, calling simply for an agreement on the settlement issue. The fate of Palestinian refugees also goes unmentioned until phase three of the road map, which calls not for any specific action, but for an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to the refugee issue.
Given the political clout of Israeli settlers and Palestinian refugees, the road map's ambiguity on these issues is understandable -- no workable peace plan can alienate both groups from the very beginning. But a plan that postpones the harsh realities of the peace process will also have little chance of success. Small concessions and easy compromises will amount only to big disappointments if the most divisive questions are saved for last.
If Israelis and Palestinians are serious about resolving their conflict, they must accept the costly concessions required for peace. The United States can help them in this process by bringing the issues of refugees and settlers to the forefront of negotiations. America must impress upon both parties the necessity of resolving these two issues, even if it risks derailing the road map entirely.
Given its blunt approach to foreign policy, the Bush administration seems ideally suited to this task. But Bush must avoid the temptation to seek superficial agreements at the expense of more meaningful progress toward peace. Handshakes and photo-ops may improve the President's public image, but they cannot bring about a permanent peace if the settler and refugee problems remain unresolved.
In the coming weeks and months, Bush must aggressively seek an agreement on these issues, using all the carrots and sticks at his disposal. These should include public pronouncements of the necessity of resolving the refugee and settler problems, granting or withholding aid money to both sides based on their efforts to achieve an agreement and enlisting the support of foreign powers in bringing pressure on both parties.
Overcoming the entrenched opposition of Israeli settlers and Palestinian refugees may seem a daunting task, but Bush has little trouble defying the will of his political opponents. In fighting Iraq last spring, Bush overcame the objections of countless nations and international organizations. If he approaches the peace process with similar vigor, there is no reason he cannot overcome the objections of settlers and refugees as well.
Last week's summit was an important symbolic gesture, but the first steps toward peace will not produce a final settlement until the larger obstacles are overcome. If Bush is to achieve a meaningful peace accord, he must place the highest hurdles first and demand a prompt resolution of the settler and refugee problems.
(Alec Solotorovsky is a Cavalier Daily associate editor. He can be reached at asolotorovsky@cavalierdaily.com)