IT HAS been over nine months since military operations commenced in Iraq to oust the dictator Saddam Hussein. Saddam was targeted in order to control the weapons of mass destruction, which he was purportedly manufacturing and hiding. In those nine months, U.S. and British forces have found little if any evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or manufacturing facilities for them.
Recently, David Kay, the CIA's special advisor on the search for WMD's in Iraq stepped down, saying of the search for WMD: "I don't think they existed"("Former U.N. inspector to head WMD hunt in Iraq" CNN.com, Jan. 23). Kay's other comments since his resignation have pointed to errors the intelligence organizations made. It is his opinion that "the intelligence community owes the president (an explanation) rather than the president owing the American people"("U.S., Britain downplay Kay remarks" CNN.com, Jan. 26). If any part of these allegations against the intelligence community serving the president is true, the United States and Britan must investigate and restructure the intelligence organizations before the president can trust the information from these groups again.
Both the United States and Great Britain have nearly disregarded Kay's assertions, stating that the removal of Saddam Hussein was enough justification for the war in Iraq regardless of the presence any WMD. It must be acknowledged that the ousting of Saddam Hussein is a positive development for Iraq, the Middle East and the world, as the world is a better place with Saddam in American custody. However, although removing him from power was one of the secondary objectives of the Iraq war, the main premise justifying the American and British military action was to find and remove WMD, which has not come to pass. The United States and Britain must not justify any possible errors in intelligence by highlighting the positive outcomes of the war. Neither the United States nor Great Britain should be taking the possibility that their intelligence about Iraq's WMDs might have been flawed or exaggerated as lightly as they appear to be. Although the Bush administration has announced that they plan on reviewing pre-war intelligence to verify its factuality, it has not made any definite or concrete plans to do so.
If there were serious flaws or exaggerations in the data that the American and British governments based their claims to go to war on, those governments should immediately evaluate their data. After all, the findings of the intelligence community were responsible for the effects on thousands of Iraqi, American and British lives, as well as the billions of dollars of expenditures necessary to finance the war, keep the peace and rebuild Iraq. If the intelligence was wrong, then American and British administrations face the risk that they may have sentenced hundreds to death due to some wrong or exaggerated facts. If this is the case, it is vital that both governments reconstruct their intelligence communities.
The initial phase of the war on Iraq is, for the most part, over. Although allied forces face a constant insurgency, any exit from Iraq during this vital period would probably lead to negative consequences for the Iraqi people. Also, so many lives and resources have been devoted to obtaining control of Iraq and capturing Saddam Hussein and his cohorts that leaving Iraq now would yield a huge loss for the Americans and British. Yet, the inherent problem remains. It is not certain whether the intelligence provided to the allied governments about Iraq's WMD was accurate. Whether these facts were wrong by error or on purpose through exaggeration is inconsequential. If they were not correct, something must be done about the situation. The United States and its allies are fighting an ongoing war against terrorism where intelligence is the main weapon. If that weapon is flawed, it could spell death and destruction for innocent people around the world. The United States and Great Britain must immediately commence investigations into the veracity of the intelligence they were provided. If errors or problems are uncovered, they must be solved through organizational reconstruction or any other means that the governments of these countries have at their disposition. If mistakes were made concerning the intelligence of Iraq's WMD the same mistakes must not be allowed to occur again.
(Alex Rosemblat's column appears Wednesdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at arosemblat@cavalierdaily.com.)