THIS WEEK marks the one-year anniversary of the American-led coalition intervention in Iraq. The tragic events across the Atlantic in Spain offer appropriate incentive to pause and take stock of the international political landscape, with special attention to the effects of the Bush administration's policy of unilateral intervention. While the toppling of his regime and the capture of Saddam Hussein has led some to declare this policy a victory for the Bush administration, a brief examination of new challenges facing the United States' position in the world offers a less rosy picture. Setting domestic political considerations aside for the moment, the so-called "Bush Doctrine" of unilateral intervention, as applied in the second Gulf War, should be considered a failure.
We should hastily acknowledge that the American-led intervention in Iraq deposed a dictator who presented a threat to many nations throughout the world. Putting aside the debate over the imminence of this threat, Hussein's capture removed a belligerent regime through the persistence of President Bush. We may surmise that the Bush administration anticipated that tentative allies, who had first balked at the invitation to join the coalition of military forces, would re-join the bandwagon in time for the reconstruction of Iraq as a pillar of Western democracy in the Arab world. As recent months have born out, few nations have come around, leaving the United States holding the bag in the expensive reconstruction effort.
Admittedly, detractors of the Bush Doctrine should be reminded that only hindsight is 20-20. However, there are several important implications of the administration's policy that will continue to challenge U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future.
First, as the intervention train picked up speed out of the station, many of America's Cold War allies could not jump off fast enough. The vehement dissension of France was soon joined by Germany, which, it should be noted, saw a political shift in its chancellor election primarily thanks to public revulsion to the Iraq policy of the former administration. The most recent parliamentary upset in Spain, even after a terrorist tragedy within that nation, as well as prolonged popular assaults on the British majority party, demonstrates the political vulnerability of leaders who joined with the president in supporting intervention.
Second, by resorting to force when diplomatic overtures were rebuffed only weakens the credibility of American power as projected world-wide. The failure of Bush to win U.N. assistance in the rebuilding effort displays how far outside the circle of international consensus the Iraq initiative has been relegated. Additionally, nations hostile to the United States -- such as North Korea, Syria, and Iran -- are invited to redouble efforts to arm themselves in anticipation of a zealous American pre-emption rather than find incentive to engage in international diplomacy.
Third, the American-driven "democratization" of Iraq displays a fundamental lack of understanding of the precepts of Arab government. While American federalism assumes a dynamic factionalism predicated upon a society free of deep class conflict and religious fundamentalism, Muslim political traditions render religion and government inseparable. To artificially manufacture a secular society without regard for thousands of years of societal development is risky at best, fatal at worst. Though democratic precepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive from Muslim traditions of government, machinations by Western powers to implant a foreign system of government only destabilizes other Muslim nations in the region, fueling an eruption of anti-Western sentiment from religious groups. Examples include fundamentalist reforms undertaken by Saudi Arabia in response to social unrest following Desert Storm, as well as the vote by Turkey's parliament -- a traditional U.S. ally -- to decline the American request to mobilize troops there during the second Gulf War. U.S. policy now practically guarantees massive social unrest for any Arab regime that acquiesces to American policy initiatives. This destabilization is dangerous to U.S. interests in the region.
Though the Bush administration successfully removed a dictator from power, American international interests have not improved since the policy of unilateralism has been implemented. It should be hoped that the recent flight of American allies deter further Machiavellian tactics from the administration. The United States cannot continue to pursue strategies that place short-term tactical interests above long-term diplomatic efficacy.
Preston Lloyd's column appears Thursdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at plloyd@cavalierdaily.com.
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