LAST THURSDAY'S presidential inauguration could loosely be described as the most secure event in the history of the world. With 6,000 law enforcement officers on duty, 7,000 U.S. troops in reserve and a total of 50 federal, state and local agencies coordinating security, Washington, D.C. was transformed into an occupied city. The FAA and the North American Aerospace Defense Command enforced a 23-mile no-fly zone, chemical and biological sensors monitored the air and jamming devices ensured no one could detonate an explosive with a cell phone or other remote device
The massive security effort worked -- there were no major incidents -- but for all the millions of dollars spent, the sad reality of last Thursday and the post Sept. 11-world is that no amount of money or manpower may stop a determined individual from executing an attack.
"Perfect" security is an oxymoron. Not only is such a goal inconceivable, but the assumption that perfect security is plausible is both dangerous and foolish. The federal government certainly realized that perfect security was not possible for the presidential inauguration as seen by the large amount of time and effort spent on planning for search and rescue efforts, training bomb technicians and preparing for a medical emergency. All three of these are responses to terrorist attacks, not deterrents.
The nature and necessity of the secrecy that clouds the security effort at any major event or federal installation makes it hard to comment on whether or not an imminent terrorist plot has been foiled since Sept. 11. The same secrecy also precludes the general public from knowing whether or not terrorists plan attacks that would ,say, try to forcibly overwhelm security efforts or if terrorists attempt to exploit lapses in security. Last Thursday on Inauguration Day, the opportunity to exploit lapses in security was not absent from the celebrations.
There were numerous outlets from which an inauguration ticket could be obtained. Congressional offices and friends were the most popular outlets, but it was possible to purchase a ticket from a third-party vendor. The tickets were touted as counterfeit-proof, and they were, but a genuine ticket could be obtained for the right price practically anywhere. Any potential problem was supposed to be remedied by that fact that any attendant of the swearing-in ceremony had to go through the inevitable metal detector scan. But the fact is everyone didn't go through a metal detector scan.
As the fortunate recipient of a ticket to watch the swearing-in ceremony from the Capitol stage, I expected to be scanned, poked and prodded numerous times before sitting down on Thursday. Sure enough, I had my ticket examined eight or nine times by security agents, several of whom were toting automatic rifles. But arriving at one of the checkpoints, I reached for the metal keys in my pocket only to be told I was "already scanned" and was then waved through the only metal detector I encountered on the way to the stage. I sat down in my seat moments later, 200 feet from the president, having been scanned with a metal detector or patted down precisely zero times.
Was there a communication breakdown that prevented the security agents at the checkpoint from knowing the only scanning done on me prior to arriving were numerous visual checks of the color of my ticket? I want to think maybe some sophisticated X-ray camera scanned me walking to the Capitol and saw no gun or grenade hidden under my jacket and this information was forwarded to the checkpoint, but this most likely wasn't the case. Maybe, and sadly, it was assumed that because I was white, wearing a suit and did nothing suspicious that I was not a threat, but I doubt this too.
The federal government has been charged with the arduous and never-ending task of securing the homeland while at the same time balancing our personal freedoms. As far as we know, their mission so far has been successful. But the government must realize that there is an equal if not greater chance that the next terrorist attack won't be terrorists launching a full-frontal assault on a target but rather someone slipping through the security net because of an assumption or a communication error. Both a vigilant posture and the precious balance between security and liberty must be maintained.
Joe Schilling's column appears Tuesdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at jschilling@cavalierdaily.com.
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