THE RECENT six-party deal on North Korea was greeted with unnerving criticism from conservatives and a gleeful "I told you so" from liberals. Politics and ideology aside, the agreement must be viewed as a glum acknowledgement from the Bush administration that it was the least-bad of a set of horrible alternatives. These included starting a nuclear war or allowing North Korea to develop into a nuclear Wal-Mart. That said, it is important to consider some of the legitimate criticisms of the deal, since the issue is far from resolved.
Despite the Bush administration's suggestion that the deal indicated or embodied the concept of unity among the six parties -- South Korea, North Korea, Japan, the United States, China and Russia -- it is unclear whether this unity would last in the long run. As many critics note, the deal includes a provision for considering the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist states as well as the future promise of 50,000 tons of fuel aid to North Korea without coercing it to disarm completely. This directly undermines Japanese claims that Pyongyang's kidnappings of Japanese citizens constitute terrorist acts, and the Japanese policy that there should be no resumption of aid until the abduction issue is resolved.
According to the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, North Korea and Japan have recently been involved in fiery diplomacy over the mistreatment of Japan of North Korean expatriates, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il also recently gave an order to seize Japanese-made cars in the nation. These divisions could threaten the stability of the negotiations.
Related to this point, it remains unclear whether Russia and China will continue to support other, more hard-line policies that the United States has employed, or whether they will instead coerce the United States to abandon these tactics under the pretext of "continuing negotiations." Bruce Klingner of the Heritage Foundation contends that both nations won't uphold the provisions of UN Resolution 1718, which bans trade of material and technology related to weapons of mass destruction to Pyongyang, as well as other "economic restrictions."
While Klingner fails to note that these "economic restrictions," -- in particular the United States insisting on freezing North Korean assets in Macau -- were the very factor that created a renewed impasse between the two countries, he is nevertheless right to caution that Russia and China will be less likely to endorse more coercive U.S. efforts in the future since the more conciliatory approach favored by the two nations has prevailed in the present.
Criticisms that the deal could lead to South Korean "over-engagement" of North Korea or its unwillingness to foot the bill for the aid package are both largely unfounded. Just last week, the Washington Post reported that South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun worried about North Korea's potential back-tracking out of the agreement, and that he would ensure that the deal was carried out by taking advantage of his nation's "leverage over Pyongyang." He also that he felt the deal was so crucial that his nation was even willing to "bear it all" to resolve the problem. Both these statements indicate the South Korean stance of a happy balance between caution and willingness.
Other criticisms center on the dubious record of the North Koreans -- specifically their reneging of their commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework. First, it is important to understand that the past agreement failed due to North Korea and the United States dragging their feet equally on specific measures. Second, the current agreement does not endorse North Korean credibility, but is a tacit acknowledgement that despite previous distrust, an agreement that forces North Korea to stop the operation of its nuclear reactor will cap its program instead of allowing it to grow -- the best we canhope for.
Third, the agreement promised North Korea a wider set of incentives, including normal diplomatic relations with the United States, which the regime craves,. Further, Pyongyang will also have to answer to all six powers rather than just the United States if it does cheat on the agreement. Lastly, those who argue that the United States should not have offered any deal until North Korea first showed signs of change refuse to acknowledge current realities. Attempts to change behavior through harsh political rhetoric and economic sanctions have never worked on this issue.
The Wall Street Journal, with its usual neo-conservative slant, called the deal "faith-based proliferation." But the current deal is more aptly termed "reality-based proliferation" since it constitutes a shift from the 'faith-based' neo-con policy adopted earlier in the Bush presidency of praying for North Korean behavioral change through a policy of coercion.
The world's powers would do well to hedge their bets on a step-by-step diplomatic approach rather than on a failed policy of economic and diplomatic coercion that relies on false faith.
Prashanth Parameswarn's column appears Wednesdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at pparameswaran@cavalierdaily.com.
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