MAO Zedong,the charismatic leader of the People's Republic of China, was known for his mesmerizing ability to handle and resolve seeming "contradictions" regarding certain principles. Contemporary U.S. policy regarding Pakistan could use a healthy dose of Maoist thinking, for it is paralyzed by adamant suggestions by "pro-counterterrorism" advocates and "pro-democracy" supporters who insist that promoting democracy and fighting terrorism are mutually exclusive and contradictory. Constructing a new U.S. policy toward Islamabad requires us to resolve this false contradiction.
"Pro-counterterrorism" advocates admit the fundamental political reality that the Pakistani army is the best institution equipped to fight the war on terrorism, and so the United States should support it even at the expense of democracy. But, they say, the United States should also show Pakistan it means business by imposing sticks on Musharraf to compel Pakistan to change its behavior.
The history of U.S.-Pakistani relations, however, suggests otherwise. Sanctions in the 1990s further crystallized Pakistani links with radical Islamists and caused strong resentment within sections of the military against the United States. Further infuriating Pakistan's army and radicalizing Pakistan would impede, rather than advance, the U.S. war on terrorism. Sanctions will therefore be counterproductive.
Pro-democracy proponents rail against the Bush administration policy of dealing with Musharraf because it obstructs the long-term goal of democracy. The best option, then, is for the United States to call for the total removal of the Pakistani army from politics, and deal with a new, democratically elected, civilian government.
The problem with this view is that it naively ignores the historical record of Pakistani governance. Pakistan has been ruled either by direct or indirect military dictatorship. Even civilian rule has seen the army control most of foreign and defense policy. Hence, bringing in a civilian government overnight will not solve the entrenched, systemic problems of Pakistani politics.
What both 'pro-counterterrorism' and 'pro-democracy' advocates fail to realize is that promoting democracy and fighting terrorism are not mutually exclusive goals in the case of Pakistan. Musharraf's unpopularity and illegitimacy is a major cause of his inability to fight the war on terrorism with the full support of the Pakistani population. Similarly, the Pakistani army's links with radical Islamist groups and the Taliban are a strategic hedge against 'non-democratic' U.S. aid, which focuses purely on security instead of the development of Pakistan as a whole.
How should the United States resolve this "contradiction?" First, it should 'democratize' its aid by allocating more funds to efforts that benefit Pakistani society, rather than purely security-centric needs. Pakistan's public education system is in shambles, and its judicial, electoral and civil institutions are nascent. Democratizing aid would both increase the popularity of the United States in Pakistan among Pakistani society and reassure the Pakistani army that the United States will remain engaged in the long term, rather than abandoning Pakistan as soon as Osama Bin Laden is captured or the war on terrorism loses momentum.
Second, the United States must help Pakistan address its major security concerns. The origin of the military's dominant political role is rooted in Pakistan's asymmetric security vulnerability vis-a-vis India and its legitimate fears of being encircled by India and Afghanistan in a two-front war. The army is allied with radical Islamists and Taliban elements because they are potential allies in the face of potential U.S. abandonment of Pakistan. If these threats are reduced, the increasingly impatient Pakistani masses will clamor for the military to take a backseat, and the military will be in a more comfortable mind-set to do so.
The United States can facilitate this in two ways. First, it should help to increase the pace of Indo-Pakistani normalization, which will thaw tenuous relations between traditional rivals. Secondly, it must continue to maintain a sustained and stable presence in Afghanistan. The main reason for Pakistan's radical Islamist and Taliban links is that they hedge against a possible U.S. withdrawal from Kabul and an Indian takeover, causing Pakistan a two-front war. If Pakistan is convinced that the United States is committed in Afghanistan, it will have less of an incentive to disrupt stability there.
Third, the United States should support fair and transparent elections, because they will very likely bring to power a coalition comprising the army and other moderate parties like Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. This would both ensure a limited democratic outcome while allowing Bhutto to use her popular support to better fight extremism. While this is not the ideal pro-democracy solution, it is the most realistic one.
Recent volatile events in Pakistan have led to polarized views that see democracy and counterterrorism as opposing goals. Any U.S. foreign policy outlook toward Pakistan must resolve this false contradiction and replace it with a more nuanced and complex set of alternatives.
Prashanth Parameswaran's column appears Wednesdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at pparameswaran@cavalierdaily.com.
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