THE CIA'S assassination plots against the regime in Cuba during the last four decades read like a comic book. Dozens of ridiculous plots were hatched to overthrow and undermine the legitimacy of Fidel Castro's regime, including sneaking thallium salts into his shoes to make his legendary beard fall out, placing an explosive conch shell in Fidel's favorite diving spot and lacing his Cuban cigars with toxic chemicals. What is less hilarious and far more destructive is the overall U.S. policy toward Cuba, which has been stymied by a narrow focus on regime change and an archaic economic embargo, rather than constructive engagement.
The lingering question in Washington since Fidel slipped into illness has been "What will happen after Castro?" rather than reviewing a U.S. policy that has been counterproductive and inimical to promoting democracy and improving the well-being of the Cuban people. The real question, however, is what will happen to U.S. policy regarding Cuba after the Bush administration, and whether the next president in power will finally admit to this epic foreign policy failure.
Two weeks ago, the United Nations General Assembly, which includes almost all of the world's nations, voted 184-4 in favor of lifting the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The 45-year-old embargo has prevented U.S. citizens from trading, investing or traveling to Cuba, and has been tightened in recent years via the Helms-Burton Act and other pieces of legislation. During the Cold War, the United States enacted the embargo and later continued it because of Cuba's role as a bastion of Soviet Communism within the United States' sphere of influence.
But it is not exactly clear why it exists today, except as a Cold War relic enforced by obstinate American politicians. It is certainly not a security measure. In 1998, according to a 2005 Cato Institute Report, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency concluded that Cuba "did not pose a significant military threat to the U.S. or to other countries in the region." Neither has it succeeded as an economic lever in sanctioning the Castro regime, which has managed to sustain itself via its own revolutionary successes in social welfare, external help from the Soviet Union and Venezuela and increasing nickel prices. The embargo cannot claim to advance democracy because it clearly stifles opposition when Castro simply blames his government's failures onthe security and economic squeeze of the United States and prosecutes his domestic political opponents under the banner of "foreign agents." Nor can it sincerely dream of improving the lives of ordinary Cubans, who would be much better off with increased U.S. tourism, overseas remittances and private sector growth.
How should the United States change its policy toward Cuba? First, it needs to lessen its focus on transition governments and regime change. Such an interventionist approach has alienated even Cuban dissidents like Oswaldo Paya and Elizardo Sanchez in the past, and it continues to do so now with some warning that hostile reports could lead to the imprisonment of political dissidents in Cuba. This would increase the divisions in an already fragmented dissident movement that remains highly penetrated by Cuban counterintelligence and is characterized by the vicissitudes of emerging and outgoing leaders.
Secondly, more focus should be placed on eradicating the embargo and coming to a political settlement with Cuba. Such discussions can focus on the shared interests of the United States and Cuba, such as migration, terrorism, environmental preservation and eradicating the trafficking of humans and drugs. The current Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which ties the termination of the embargo to the fulfillment of certain democratic conditions in Cuba, is not feasible simply because democratization, as evidenced from past experience, has been a gradual process rather than one externally enforced by shock therapy. The additional restrictions imposed by the U.S. government in 2004, which placed restrictions on U.S.-based Cubans sending money, food and medicines, did not weaken the Castro regime but are deeply unpopular among Cuban Americans, according to The Financial Times. They do nothing but alienate the Cuban people and strengthen Cuban nationalism.
It does not matter who takes over after Fidel Castro. Despite excitement over Raul Castro, many observers fail to note that it was Raul, not Fidel who proposed the radical move of the Cuban Revolution into the Soviet orbit. He is also 75, and will not last long in power. He has promised economic reform, but has been largely silent on political change. Nor does it matter what the U.S. president says on television. When President Bush delivered his speech on Cuba earlier this year, The Financial Times reported that Cuba's state-controlled media reprinted large chunks of the speech to generate anti-American sentiment.
In order to effect change in Cuba, the United States needs political and economic leverage. Empty rhetoric and an archaic embargo will not help it in this regard.
Prashanth Parameswaran's column appears Wednesdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at pparameswaran@cavalierdaily.com.