WITH SO much attention focused on domestic issues, one may have been surprised to learn that United States had removed North Korea from its list of terrorism-sponsoring states this weekend. The act is a result of ongoing talks with North Korea and the nation’s claim that it will provide greater transparency in its nuclear program. There is still a long way to go before the North Korean nuclear threat can be eliminated, but the new policy is an important indicator of how the negotiations are playing out. The gains made by the United States do not measure up to the benefits North Korea intends to reap from its new status, and the agreement between the two countries seems to be an attempt at saving face rather than a significant achievement.
At first glance the act looks to be a successful milestone; just last month North Korea rejected an armament reduction deal with the United States and four other countries and threatened to restart development of its plutonium-producing reactor out of anger over its place on the blacklist. However, the agreement can be credited to a concession made by the United States rather than a North Korean step forward. According to an Oct. 12 Washington Post report, government officials “said North Korea had bent on two key points: potential access to facilities not included in Pyongyang’s nuclear declaration and permission for inspectors to take environmental samples.” The agreement also allows for South Korean and Japanese participation in some of the inspections. These are both positive steps (although the term “potential access” raises a few questions), but the same article also points out that “officials ... do not have permission to visit the site of North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test or any military facilities possibly involved in the nuclear program. Experts will have access to facilities at the Yongbyon reactor site and some academic institutions; visits to additional sites will be subject to negotiations.” The ability to visit military facilities and previous test sites is necessary for a comprehensive inspection, and its notable absence from the agreement renders America’s gains from the negotiation almost useless.
North Korea, on the other hand, will no longer have to suffer the burdens of a place on the blacklist: trade sanctions, restrictions on access to international finance, and the inability to use global settlement banks. The new freedoms granted to the nation will surely increase its economic and political power, giving it greater influence in future negotiations and more resources to uphold or even expand its domestic policies, which are severely lacking in human rights. In the previously mentioned Post article, Michael J. Green, President Bush’s former top aide in Asian foreign policy, notes that “there is a real danger that Pyongyang will pull a bait and switch now that sanctions have been lifted.” Continued pressure on the regime may have led it to adopt some of the principles employed by the more economically successful southern half of the peninsula. North Korea’s economy is highly dependent on its military. The previously mentioned sanctions would have limited the nation’s ability to form successful relations with other countries; this would isolate its military and reduce its legitimacy. By improving the status of the country, the United States has increased the longevity of Kim Jong-il’s disastrous regime.
In addition to giving more leverage to North Korea, the new policy also weakens American international relations, especially with Japan. North Korea’s past abduction of Japanese citizens has not been forgiven, and the Japanese may view the American-North Korean agreement as a blatant disregard of their own interests. Japan’s Finance Minister, Shoichi Nakagawa, called the U.S. removal of North Korea from the blacklist “extremely regrettable.” The United States cannot afford to damage its standing in eastern Asia, particularly with an important trading partner like Japan. Green thinks that “the credibility of this agreement really hangs on what happens next, including how we repair the damage done with Tokyo.” Instead of attempting to salvage broken deals, the United States should seek greater cooperation and support from its allies and the United Nations. Putting more global pressure on North Korea would do more to discredit its legitimacy as well as help the United States build favorable relations worldwide.
The desire for an accomplishment in North Korean nuclear relations is understandable; the American people are desperate for good news. But part of successful negotiation is knowing when to walk away from the table, and successful negotiation will produce true good news in the future. Presidential candidate Barack Obama described the decision to remove North Korea from the blacklist as “a modest step forward.” We must ask ourselves: Is this a step in the right direction?
Mitch Ross’s column appears Thursdays in The Cavalier Daily. He can be reached at m.ross@cavalierdaily.com.