The verdict in Jason Smith’s open honor trial was shocking, disappointing, and saddening. As several students have argued this week, more than reasonable doubt existed as to his guilt. And observers at his trial agreed nearly unanimously on the triviality of his actions. If we all shared Smith’s apathetic work ethic, the academic community would surely be compromised; and he therefore deserved to fail the class. Open toleration of his deception, however, would break only the weakest bonds of trust.
More alarming is the fundamentally unfair process that led to his conviction. The Honor Committee pledges to all students “a fair process for investigation and adjudication of Alleged Honor Offenses.” Last Sunday, however, the system failed to protect Smith from overzealous accusations and draconian application of the single sanction.
I do not know Smith. Nor, I suspect, do most members of the University. But, as members of the community of trust, we are all harmed by denials of basic due process in Committee proceedings. There are four particularly troubling aspects of his trial.
First, Smith was not tried by a jury of his peers. Although the Committee’s by-laws call only for “a panel of randomly-selected students” to deliver a verdict, the accused may have at least two members selected from his school. The purpose is obvious: to have jurors with his shared academic experience.
However, a second major category shapes the experiences of students: class year. An individual’s perspective on honor — and what is trivial or not — surely develops during his time here. Having a jury that heavily favors older or younger students might lead to inconsistent and unjust verdicts. Five of 11 jurors who convicted Smith were first-years; only four had moved beyond their second year. Critically, not one juror was the same year as Smith.
Contrast this young jury with the group of observers who would have found Smith not guilty: third- and fourth-year students compromised the majority along with several graduate students and parents of counsel. While this difference does not alone explain opposite outcomes, it is reasonable to assume it was a factor.
From the accused’s ability to include members of his school or department on his jury, we may reasonably “deduce the . . . responsibility” of the Committee to afford additional procedures necessary for “fundamental fairness” as allowed under the by-laws. This must include the ability to have jurors from your class present on the jury as well. Practically, it may be difficult to get such diversity on the jury. But it is a necessity for fairness — and that must always trump feasibility as a concern.
Secondly, lack of precedent on non-triviality may have led to an inconsistent application of the single sanction. Since non-triviality requires only a majority vote by the jury to convict, precedent is especially important when a near majority of a jury reflects only one school or one class year.
Because the Committee keeps its proceedings confidential, student juries must make their determination of non-triviality based on personal belief alone. Therefore, what was non-trivial on one day may be trivial the next depending on the students randomly selected. It is fundamentally unfair for a student’s dismissal to turn on happenstance.
Additionally, the primary witness provided unfairly prejudicial testimony to the jury. All students should be entitled to report honor offenses to the Committee. But when a member of the Committee is bringing the charge, special procedures should be required to ensure impartiality. In Smith’s trial, Mary Siegel proved to be an effective witness. In fact, she showed a greater command of the evidence and process than counsel for the community did.
However, a critical portion of her testimony concerned conversations between Smith and the other student facilitator to which Siegel was not a participant. The trial chair should have excluded such testimony as hearsay evidence since it could lead to the improper assumption of consistency between the facilitators’ accounts of their individual conversations with Smith.
More importantly, her belief that Smith’s actions were non-trivial should have been inadmissible. That is a question solely for the jury. Given both her recent public campaign and election as Vice-Chair for Investigations — and the predominantly first- and second-year composition of the jury — is it inconceivable that her verdict on his guilt unfairly prejudiced jurors? Siegel is not an expert on honor, so her opinion should be irrelevant to the jury’s deliberations. Any consideration of those statements by the jury is improper and, therefore, should not have been allowed in the first place.
Although counsel for the accused brilliantly impeached the credibility of Siegel’s recollection towards the end of the trial (indeed, Siegel curiously relied heavily on the evidence packet to guide her testimony), that alone cannot cure prejudicial testimony already admitted. Testimony should have been limited to written statements from Siegel and live testimony from the other facilitator.
Lastly, impartiality of the Committee cannot be assumed when charges are brought by its own members. The fact that the primary witness against Smith also serves on the Committee greatly limited Smith’s options in selecting his jury panel. Given the significant time commitment of serving on the Committee, members naturally become friends outside of their work. It is doubtful that members serving on the Investigation Panel could serve as an effective check on accusations by other members in the initial stages of the process. Could such a panel then effectively weigh the testimony of one of its own members free from bias at a trial? What student would choose those very same members to serve on his trial panel? A jury of his peers was his only viable option.
Siegel’s role in Smith’s conviction similarly compromises his right to appeal. The impartiality of the Committee is not infallible. I question whether the members of the committee on the appeal review panel would act as more than a rubber-stamp on the verdict.
As stewards of the community of trust, and beneficiaries of its privileges, we must recognize, as Thomas Jefferson did, that “the best method of government for youth in large collections is certainly a desideratum not yet attained by us.” We must constantly strive to ensure that all individuals in honor proceedings receive the full protection of due process. The by-laws grant the power to the Committee to enact such measures, but so long as Smith’s conviction is upheld, fundamental fairness is not a guarantee.
Today, our community is threatened not by the actions of Smith, but by the unjust and unfair method of his dismissal.
Robert Baldwin is a third-year student in the Law School.
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