Following an extended delay, the University released two reports and an executive summary focused on the Nov. 13, 2022 shooting which killed three students and injured two others. The reports were released Friday morning in an email from University President Jim Ryan.
A report conducted by law firm Vinson & Elkins evaluated the University’s response to the emergency and found that while the response was largely consistent with police and best-practice methods, the alert system had some delays due to bureaucratic inefficiencies.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan conducted a separate report which focused on the practices and procedures of the University’s Threat Assessment Team during the period leading up to the event and evaluated areas for improvement. The report concluded that while the shooting likely could not have been prevented with the information available, the University’s TAT faced significant limitations which compromised the effectiveness of its functions.
Nov. 13, 2022, three students — Lavel Davis Jr., D’Sean Perry and Devin Chandler — lost their lives and two others were injured after Christopher Darnell Jones, Jr. opened fire on a school bus returning from a field trip to Washington. The University remained under lockdown for 12 hours as Jones was at-large.
Following this event, the Board of Visitors and University President Jim Ryan requested that Virginia Attorney General Jason Miyares appoint outside special counsel to review the University’s threat assessment process and post-shooting response. The firms were appointed by the Office of the Attorney General Dec. 9, 2022 to conduct these reviews separately and deliver their reports and recommendations to the Board.
The law firms first presented the reports to the Board Oct. 20, 2023 and delivered the final reports Jan. 31, 2024, after making tweaks for factual accuracy. Since then, the University has implemented many of the suggestions outlined in the reports including establishing the Office of Threat Assessment to lead the TAT and the Violence Prevention Committee. The University has also shifted from an opt-in text alert system to an opt-out one, which has more than doubled the number of students receiving text alerts, according to Timothy Longo, chief of the University Police Department.
The release of these reports to the public was significantly delayed due to Jones’s criminal proceedings — in consultation with Jim Hingeley, Commonwealth’s Attorney for Albemarle County, the University chose to delay the release of the reports until the criminal prosecution concluded. Following Jones’s guilty plea in November, the University announced in February that it would release the results of the reports.
The University heavily redacted both reports, citing the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act. FERPA makes it illegal for universities to disclose the educational records of current and former students. In accordance with FERPA, all information relating to both Jones and the victims was redacted in addition to sensitive information regarding certain University operational plans.
The University noted that they had asked Jones to waive his FERPA rights, and he had declined to do so. However, according to the University, much of the factual information contained in the report regarding Jones and the victims is already available through non-University sources.
The review conducted by the Vinson & Elkins law firm concluded that the University response to the Nov. 13, 2022 shooting was broadly a success in that, following the initial incident, the University and University Police Departments were able to prevent the loss of further life.
“The initial emergency response in the aftermath of the shooting appropriately prioritized the preservation of life and the prevention of further injury,” the report said. “Measured against that critical metric, the response was a success.”
According to the Vinson & Elkins report, the University and UPD — which have separate but mutually reinforcing policies for emergency management — largely adhered to relevant policies and executed critical incident responses successfully. However, the report also noted that there were several areas in which the University can improve its critical incident management going forward and provided recommendations to facilitate this.
One of the main findings of the review dealt with changes to the University alert system which, according to the report, failed to initially distribute information in a timely manner. The report said that the initial delay in alerting community members could be attributed to an overly cumbersome system which demanded multiple levels of approval before an alert was authorized. While the first 911 call was received at around 10:16 p.m. and the first officers arrived on the scene at 10:19 p.m., an initial alert was not sent out to community members until 10:32 p.m, a delay which could have endangered lives.
“Any delay in the issuance of the initial UVA Alert therefore places students, faculty, staff, and community members at risk,” the report said.
The University, in its own After-Action Report, also noted that the alerts did not reach as many people as they could have due to the small number of people who had opted-in to receive text alerts. Moreover, while the University alert systems have a siren in order to warn people who may be separated from their phones, the siren did not sound at any point during the November 2022 incident.
The report recommended that going forward, the University should provide more extensive training regarding the use of the emergency siren. Moreover, it suggested that the University should empower UPD to issue alerts directly after learning of an active threat.
The report commended law enforcement officials for quickly and safely moving witnesses to a different location after the traumatic incident. However, it noted that the officers’ failure to announce themselves when entering North Grounds Recreation Center — the location where the University’s Counseling & Psychological Services counselors were waiting— created undue burden and stress on community members sheltering in the building. These community members reported needlessly feeling as if their life was in danger. To address this, the report recommended developing more extensive training for officers regarding the importance of identifying themselves before entering a building during an active threat.
Another recommendation within the report included providing more extensive training to UPD officers and local law enforcement on a “grid search plan,” which would help facilitate efficient searches of Grounds. While law enforcement officials originally planned to conclude the search for Jones at 7 a.m. after beginning at 5:30 a.m., the search was not completed until 10:34 a.m.
In addition to providing other recommendations to enhance the University’s critical event response, the report reflected upon the two After Action Reports which were compiled by the University. The first report dealt specifically with the 24-hour period after the shooting. The second dealt with the same period and the days between Nov. 13 and Nov. 21. Many of the University's conclusions and proposed initiatives aligned with the Vinson & Elkins report.
“We agree with many of the University’s self-assessments regarding important ‘areas to improve’ and associated proposed corrective actions to improve its response capabilities,” the report said.
However, the report also noted that the University may have been able to pre-empt some of the recommendations in the report. According to the report, the University conducted a “tabletop active shooter response exercise” June 17, 2022. This exercise imitated a mass casualty situation in order to test the Critical Incident Management Plan, but the University did not finalize an analysis of this exercise until Jan. 2, 2023.
“The six-and-a-half month delay between the tabletop exercise and the completion of the [report] missed a critical opportunity for U.Va. to implement lessons learned from the exercise prior to the shooting on Nov. 13, 2022,” the report said.
The external review conducted by Quinn Emanuel focused on the functions and effectiveness of the University’s TAT, which aims to identify possible threats to University safety and prevent violence on-Grounds, and compared the University TAT to other threat assessment divisions at peer institutions.
The TAT initially received a report that Jones possibly possessed a gun Sept. 15, 2022, following Jones’s concealed weapon conviction in 2021.
This report concluded that certain structural and procedural issues significantly limited the TAT’s ability to perform its core functions and offered nine key recommendations aimed to reduce these limitations. These issues included both resource strains within the TAT and other student support systems, as well as external challenges which limited the TAT’s power to enforce compliance with investigations.
“Critical among these weaknesses is a lack of defined scope of University authority, including with respect to student housing, a culture that is overly deferential to student autonomy, resource constraints, investigative limitations, lack of communication and the lack of a case-management focused student support model,” the report said.
The report discussed the student self-governance model at the University where students are responsible for disciplinary decisions and governance. The Honor Committee and the University Judiciary Committee are responsible for issuing sanctions and consequences for misconduct. Findings of the report suggested that this model limits administrators’ authority to enforce student compliance with University directives, including compliance with TAT investigations, mandated by University policy HRM-028.
“U.Va.’s unique student governance model is a core feature of the University’s culture, but it may impede the University’s ability to address non-compliance and to enforce its rules in the area of public safety issues,” the report read. “Because virtually all non-criminal student conduct matters are processed through the Honor or UJC systems, the University administration appears to lack meaningful processes to enforce its policies.”
The report also suggests that the student body does not take the UJC seriously as an organization which ensures discipline and safety. In October 2022, the University had informed Jones that he would be referred to the UJC for failing to disclose his concealed weapon violation, which is a violation of student conduct standards.
One recommendation of the report related to the student self-governance model is that the administration should take more of a role in student discipline. The University in response created the Policy, Accountability and Critical Events office in the Division of Student Affairs. PACE handles many responsibilities, including investigating organizational hazing cases.
The report also found that the University lacks a framework to assess and support students in crisis or distress, even if they do not pose an immediate threat to public safety. A solution the report suggests is the establishment of a Coordination, Assessment, Response and Education or a Behavioral Intervention Team, which would have membership overlap with TAT but function separately to allow TAT to focus on cases with a significant threat risk.
CARE or BIT teams can identify students ahead of time who may be in crisis, but may not necessarily pose an active threat to health and safety, and intervene appropriately.
Several TAT-specific improvements were also recommended — in the fall of 2022, the team had only one full-time employee, while other TAT members were personnel from other areas of the University, with a variety of responsibilities outside of threat assessment. Additionally, this full-time director was responsible for all administrative and case management tasks. The report recommended that the University expand resources, including adding more full-time personnel, and streamline the intake and assessment processes.
In particular, the report found issues within the TAT’s investigative processes — TAT did not search social media or access criminal records as part of investigations, and was lacking a standard practice to interview referral sources or third parties. Suggestions aimed to increase student compliance with investigations and facilitate interviews included a more proactive approach to locating and speaking with subjects, as well as increased investigative training. The report also recommended that TAT seek increased support from UPD in conducting investigations, both with contacting students to request interviews and providing access to criminal history information.
“The TAT does not have a standard practice of interviewing referral sources or third parties other than those directly implicated by the referral, and lacked a procedure to address non-cooperation with its investigation,” the report said. “There was also an apparent reluctance to involve UPD officers in non-criminal investigative activities, including location of non-responsive students, voluntary interviews or requests for voluntary searches.”
Accessibility issues with University reporting systems like the SafeGrounds mobile app and JustReportIt were also found — recommendations included a streamlined reporting process, increased awareness of TAT and various reporting platforms, as well as clearer online instructions for those reporting a concern.
Since the shooting and finalized reports, the University has taken a range of actions intended to enhance public safety and improve emergency response and prevention practices and policies. In February 2023, the University established the Office of Threat Assessment, which leads both the Violence Prevention Committee and TAT, and appointed a UPD officer liaison to the OTA.
University administration has modified TAT operating procedures, which now require UPD to investigate immediately if a firearm is reported to be on Grounds or in possession of someone who lives on Grounds. Additionally, language of TAT policies has been refined to clarify threat identification and requirements for reporting threats to law enforcement and the Office of the Attorney General.
Other changes include increased mental health care available to students, improved safety infrastructure, provision of advising and support for the Honor Committee and the UJC and increased outreach aiming to better communicate University policy and reporting procedure to students.
Ryan noted in his email that the reports will not answer all the questions that community members have nor will it lessen the tragedy of what occurred.
“[The reports don’t] ease the pain of losing beloved members of our community, and it doesn’t lessen the grief felt so deeply by the victims’ family and friends,” Ryan wrote. “It doesn’t undo the pain and trauma of those who were injured, of those who witnessed the shooting and of those who continue to grapple with all that has happened.”
Ryan said that even if the reports did not conclude that the shooting could have been reasonably predicted, the University has made necessary changes to strengthen its threat assessment ability.
“Although no one could have reasonably predicted, as the report concludes, that this violent act would occur, the report does identify areas where we can strengthen our threat assessment protocols – and in many cases, we have already done so,” Ryan wrote.
The full redacted reports can be found on a new University website, nov13reports.virginia.edu.